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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PLYING DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION, 
formerly known as FLYING DIAMOND 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited 
partnership; RALPH M. NEWTON, 
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F. 
NEWTON, general partners; and 
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually, 
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON, 
his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
and 
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO., 
a Texas corporation, 
Intervenor Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 19178 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT FLYING DIAMOND 
Appellant Flying Diamond submits this brief in reply 
to the response briefs of respondents Bass and Newton. Neither 
of those briefs follows the format of the appeal brief, nor the 
format of the other. For clarity, this reply is organized in 
terms of the seven points initially raised, and respondents' 
arguments are replied to in that context. 
FACTUAL STATEMENTS 
The statement of facts in Flying Diamond's brief was 
neither agreed to nor specifically controverted by either 
respondent, as required by the applicable rule (Utah R. 
Civ. P. 75 (p) (2)); each submitted a statement that can fairly 
be criticized as conclusionary and selective. 
The Bass statement contains two serious factual errors 
requiring correction: 
(1) Bass's purported quotation of Section 7 of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement (Bass brief, p. 3) is incorrect. 
Without indication of an omission, the quotation as it there 
appears omits language bearing directly upon the basic problem 
of the lawsuit. The actual language of Section 7 is copied 
below, the language Bass omitted being underlined: 
Subject to the provisions of Section 9 hereof, it 
is agreed that the covenants to pay the sums provided 
in Sections 2, 3, and 5 hereof shall be covenants 
running with the surface ownership of the described 
premises and shall not be held or transferred 
separately therefrom, and any sums payable under this 
agreement shall be paid to the person or persons 
owning the surface of the described premises as of the 
date the oil or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon 
production is marketed. Champlin shall not, however, 
become obligated to make such payments to any 
subsequent purchaser of the described premises and 
shall continue to make such payments to the Land Owner 
until the first day of the month following the receipt 
by Champlin of notice of change of ownership, 
consisting of the original or certified copies of the 
instrument or instruments constituting a complete 
chain of title from the Land Owner to the party 
claiming such ownership, and then only as to payments 
thereafter made. 
(R 480-81). 
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(2) Bass's brief (p. 6) states that "[n]o objection 
was made to the receipt of evidence regarding the Newton's deed 
nr the Ranch Purchase Contract." In fact, all parties agreed 
in the Pretrial Order that Flying Diamond had such an objection 
(Pretrial Order: IV, para. 4, R 280; VI, R 282) Flying Diamond 
re-stated the objection to this extrinsic evidence at the 
outset of the trial (R 526, Tr 10). By way of expedition of 
the nonjury trial, the judge received the extrinsic proof on 
the following basis, understood by all parties (R 526, Tr 10): 
THE COURT: All right. That gives me a little 
question there. As I read I was wondering if it might 
not be helpful for the purpose of -- I know you 
believe it's a matter of law and you say you have some 
testimony. What if we were to let them put on their 
witnesses, extrinsic testimony, and then as I go 
through taking your theory, if I think I need the 
extrinsic testimony I will refer to it. If not I will 
ignore it. If I take your theory --
A conspicuous omission characterizes the briefs of 
both respondents. The Bass brief omits mention of Section 4 of 
the Surface Owner's Agreement; the Newton brief purportedly 
summarizes Section 4 (Newton brief, p. 5) but omits any 
reference to the important language: "Nothing herein contained 
shall be construed ••• as a grant to Land Owner of oil or gas 
rights or rights in other associated liquid hydrocarbons." 
(R 480). The provision bears directly upon the legal nature of 
the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant. 
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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The 2 1/2% easement payment covenant, and 
the payments, are inseparable from the 
surface ownership as a matter of law. 
The theory of the point stated in the caption is that 
Champlin's covenant to make the 2 1/2% payments is a covenant 
running with the surface ownership. Its legal attributes are 
determined by the rules of real property law and not contract 
law. The effect of such rules is that the benefits of the 
covenant are inseparable from the surface ownership, so that 
the separate fractional transfer of covenant benefits which 
Bass and the Newtons say they attempted is precluded as a 
matter of law. 
Flying Diamond's Point I also demonstrated, 
alternatively, that, were the covenant to be treated as 
personal and not real, the legal consequences under contract 
law would be identical. 
Replies to the Bass and the Newton arguments about 
these basic points are set out below. 
I. (a) Covenant Running With the Land. 
The Surface Owner's Agreement was made against the 
background of the potential for dispute inherent in the 
severance of the surface estate from the oil and gas estate and 
the pre-existing legal relation between the parties. These 
factors, discussed in detail in the appeal brief (pp. 11-14) 
show the reasons for the inseparability provisions. This 
discussion was not challenged by either respondent. Neither of 
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them directly challenged the point that real property law 
governs the case. 
The authorities that are cited in the appeal brief to 
show that the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant is a running 
covenant are not repeated here. An additional case, Carlson v. 
Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 259 P.2d 925 (1953), is 
directly in point and construes an agreement which is 
essentially identical to the Surface Owner's Agreement. In 
Lindauer, the agreement was between Union Oil, the owner of the 
oil and gas estate in described lands, and the surface owners 
of the lands, who granted surface easements to Union in 
consideration of Union's covenant to pay the owners 10% of the 
value of the oil and gas and 40% of the net value of the 
gasoline produced. The agreement provided that "[t]he right to 
receive [such] payments . • shall be and remain inseparable 
from the ownership of such lands." The agreement also provided 
that, after testing the ground, Union could drop individual 
parcels from its project and, with respect to a parcel so 
excluded, Union covenanted to quitclaim the oil and gas title 
to the "Owner or Owners" thereof, subject to Union's retained 
surface rights of way. Union elected to exclude the subject 
lands, and then made and recorded the deed quitclaiming the oil 
and gas title that was at issue in the case. That oil and gas 
title was disputed as between the successor surface owners (the 
plaintiffs) and the subsequent devisees (the defendants) of 
Lucy Lindauer, the "Owner" named in the deed. The case holds: 
-5-
(1) Union's quitclaim covenant was a covenant running 
with the surface ownership, and its benefit ran to the 
successor surface owner as such. Title to the oil and gas wa~ 
accordingly quieted in plaintiffs. While the agreement 
expressly stated the inseparability of the payment covenants 
from the surface ownership, it did not contain a similar 
express statement as to the quitclaim covenant. Nevertheless, 
the court determined that all elements of a running covenant 
were present and that the quitclaim covenant could not be 
separated from the surface title. The case is a square holding 
that the elements of touch and concern, privity, and intent are 
present in circumstances identical to those of the present 
case. 
(2) The grantee named in the quitclaim deed was "Lucy 
Lindauer hereinafter referred to as 'Owner,' whether one or 
more, Second Party." This grant was held to run to the 
successor surface owners, not Lucy Lindauer's heirs. The 
similarity of the term "Owner" to the term "Land Owner" as used 
in the Surface Owner's Agreement is apparent. 
It should be noted that the Lindauer opinion refers to 
the payment covenant in the case (10%, and 40% of net) as 
"royalty." The covenant was not in issue, and the reference is 
an aside. The court used the term in its comment that the 
Union agreement carved out and granted an incorporeal 
hereditament and an interest in land. 259 P.2d at 931. In 
this respect the Union agreement differs from the Surface 
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Owner's Agreement, which in Section 4 expressly provides that 
the Agreement does not grant oil or gas rights. (R 480). 
The brief filed by Bass does not address the basic 
legal problem of covenants running with the surface ownership, 
nor does it question the proposition that, if the 2 1/2% 
covenant is held to run, it follows that its benefits are 
inseparable from the surface ownership. 
Similarly, the Newton brief does not dispute the point 
that if the covenant runs its benefits cannot be separated from 
the surface ownership. Point I of the Newton Brief asserts 
that the 2 1/2% covenant does not run, and that none of the 
elements of touch and concern, privity, or intent, is present. 
(Newton brief, pp. 10-23). 
Touch and concern. The Newton argument (p. 12) 
appears to be that the 2 1/2% payments under Section 2 "need 
not be used on the land to improve it, but may be used in any 
way the landowner wants." This is contrasted with the damage 
payments due under Section 5, which are apparently considered 
directly related to the land. The claimed conclusion is that 
the 2 1/2% payment covenant is merely personal. 
The reasoning is unclear. All three payment covenants 
are identical in nature, in that each compensates for an 
adverse impact upon the surface owner's enjoyment of his 
surface title; the inseparability language of the Surface 
Owner's Agreement is common to them all, and accords identical 
attributes to all; all of the covenants require payments to the 
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person owning the surface at the time, in the same way. The 
claimed distinction is not there. 
A list of cases is cited in the Newton brief (pp. 
14-20) in support of the Newton claim that the 2 1/2% covenant 
does not touch and concern the surface ownership. Examination 
shows that not one supports the position taken. The cited 
cases are: H.T. & c. Co. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P. 
950 (1916), is not a touch and concern case; it involves 
privity (the privity holding, discussed below, supports the 
Flying Diamond position); City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 116 
Ariz. 322, 569 P.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1977), is not a touch and 
concern case; it involves failure to satisfy the statute of 
frauds; Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 529 P.2d 741 
(1974), in which the court held that where the parties clearly 
intend to create only a personal right enforceable by the 
original covenantee, the parties negate any intent that the 
covenant touch and concern the land; Choisser is cited in 5 R. 
Powell, The Law of Real Property, ~ 673[2], at p. 60-41 & n.27 
(1981) as a court's acceptance of Dean Bigelow's proposed 
touch-and-concern test (quoted in the appeal brief at p. 20); 
Johnson v. State, 27 Or. App. 581, 556 P.2d 724 (1976), is not 
touch and concern case; according to Powell (supra, 11 673[2], 
pp. 60-44 & 60-45) , the case involves the problem whether the 
burden can run when the benefit is personal, an issue not 
involved where, as here, the question is as to the running of 
the benefit; California Packing Corp. v. Grove, 57 Cal. App. 
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153, 196 P. 891 (1921) is obviously distinguishable on its 
facts and also involved the running of a burden; the court held 
that a duty to sell peaches was personal and did not run; 
Colonia Verde Homeowners Ass'n v. Kaufman, 122 Ariz. 574, 596 
P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1979) is not a touch and concern case. 
Some Utah cases are cited by the Newtons. The 
holdings and the reasoning of the Utah cases supply further 
support for the Flying Diamond position that the 2 1/2% 
covenant runs. Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 
(1924) holds that the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment 
run with the land and are enforceable by a subsequent grantee 
in accordance with their terms, notwithstanding his actual 
knowledge of the boundary problem warranted against. 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) enforces a 
restrictive covenant in subdivision lands. Two cases, Latses 
v. Nick Floor Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940) and 
Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648 (1972) hold 
that a covenant to pay the obligation of another (legal fees) 
is personal and does not run. The touch and concern test 
stated in Lundeberg is that in order for a covenant to run the 
covenant must "be of such character that its performance or 
nonperformance will so affect the use, value or enjoyment of 
the land itself that it must be regarded as an integral part of 
the property.• 
This test is clearly met by the 2 1/2% easement 
payment covenant. Champlin's remittances on account of the 
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covenant (and its obligation to continue them for the duration 
of the oil and gas project) affect the surface owner's use, 
value and enjoyment of the surface in a fundamental way. The 
recurring payments compensate on a continuing basis for the 
burdens imposed by the continuing use of the surface easement, 
in appropriate amounts, at the times the burdens are imposed, 
and to the owner of the surface estate so imposed upon. 
Privity. The Newton brief (pp. 20-21) makes the 
assertion, not supported by any case, that the privity element 
is missing. No response is made to the demonstration in the 
appeal brief (p. 21) that, by any of the various tests, privity 
is present here. A Utah case touching the subject is H.T. & c. 
Co. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P. 950 (1916), in which a 
wife, having no title or interest in the land, joined as an 
accomodation in a warranty deed (with running covenants) made 
by her husband. The Court held that because the wife had no 
estate in the land she had no privity of estate with the 
grantee's grantee, and the covenant burden did not run as 
against her. However, the Court indicated that either a 
"mutual" or "successive" relationship in the property is 
sufficient for privity. (These are, respectively, the "mutual" 
privity and "vertical" privity appearing in Powell's 
formulation summarized in the appeal brief (p. 21)). Both 
kinds of privity are present here. The grant of surface 
easement in consideration of the surface payment ccvenants 
supplies mutuality of estate in the same land. Successive 
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privity results from Flying Diamond's purchase of the surface 
title, which constitutes its succession to the burdened surface 
and the compensating covenant payment benefits. 
Intent. The Newtons argue (pp. 21-23) that the intent 
element of a running covenant is lacking. In view of the 
literal statement in the Surface Owner's Agreement that the 
2 1/2% covenant is one of the "covenants running with the 
surface ownership," (R 290), and the fact that the agreement 
then spells out in specific terms the legal attributes of a 
running covenant, the contention is not persuasive. There was 
no such express statement in either of the two cited Utah 
cases, First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah 
2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) and Metropolitan Investment Co. v. 
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962). In those cases, the 
Court considered extrinsic facts only because of the ambiguity 
of the covenants. First Western, 27 Utah 2d at 5, 492 P.2d at 
134; Sine, 14 Utah 2d at 43, 396 P.2d at 945. In the Sine 
case, extrinsic facts showed the requisite intent; the facts in 
First Western showed a lack of such intent. 
One argument advanced in the Newton brief (p. 22) in 
an effort to show lack of intent is based upon an incorrect 
summary of the testimony of Champlin's land manager. The 
testimony there imputed to him is (in Newton's words) that 
"Champlin had no interest and wouldn't care what happened so 
far as an assignment between the surface owner and a third 
person as to the proceeds of the Champlin payment." That is 
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not what the witness said. His statement was that it would not 
matter to Champlin if a surf ace owner made an agreement to 
share the payments with another after payments were made to th., 
surface owner by Champlin (R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp 
30, 55-56). That is a wholly different idea. The witness also 
said (under Bass's cross examination) that he remembered 
instances when Union Pacific "simply made it clear that they 
did not recognize retention of rights separate from surface 
ownership." (R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp. 25-26). 
I. (b) Contract Law Principles 
The appeal brief (pp. 23-24) showed, on the basis of 
rules stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 317 
and 320 (1981), that even if the covenant were merely personal 
and contract law were applicable, no rights in the covenant or 
covenant proceeds were transferred to Bass. An assignment of 
the benefit, in the severed manner here claimed, is precluded 
by the Agreement. See id. § 317(2) (c). Such an assignment 
would materially reduce the Agreement's value to Champlin. See 
id.,§ 317(2) (a). Even if not so precluded, assignment could 
not transfer future rights to Bass free of the condition that 
the payments cease when the assignor's surface ownership ceases 
(See id. § 320, Comment c.). 
The Bass brief argues (pp. 9-10, Point I.A.) that a 
share in the proceeds of the covenant is "inherently" 
assignable. It is so argued on the reasoning that the Surface 
Owner's Agreement granted a "share of the production of 
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minerals," which is a "royalty" and thus assignable; that a 
royalty is "in the nature of common law rent," hence 
,;ssignable; that being payable in money it is "assignable 
because the right to money or future money is assignable." 
The reasoning begins from the incorrect premise that 
the covenant grants a share of the production of minerals and 
is thus a royalty. Section 4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement 
expressly negatives the premise. See R 480. Analysis of the 
problem whether the covenant benefit is or is not assignable 
should begin with the applicable provisions of the instrument 
creating the covenant. These clearly spell out a specially 
limited kind of assignability. As the Surface Owner's 
Agreement provides, the covenant benefit is transferrable, but 
only in the manner agreed, and only to a transferee having 
agreed-upon status. Here, the purported transfer failed to 
satisfy these requirements. 
Bass claims (pp. 10-11, Point I.B.) that the covenant 
proceeds can be separated from the surface ownership, and cites 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Shepard, 169 N.Y. 170, 62 N.E. 
154 (1901) as a holding to that effect. The case is clearly 
distinguishable. The case involved an office building in front 
of which an elevated railway was constructed. This gave rise 
to a claim for the railway's damage to the easements 
appurtenant to the building. Pending adjudication, the owner 
(Western Union) sold the building and its easements, 
discounting the purchase price for the railway damage and 
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specifically reserving the right to the proceeds of the dama~e 
claim. The successor to the buyer, who took with knowledge, 
was held to be bound by the reservation of the claim. The case 
holds that an accrued cause of action for trespass can be 
reserved or assigned. The case has nothing to do with the 
inseparability of the benefit of a running covenant. The 
railway damages were not "in effect, a payment for an easement 
over his [the buyer's] land," as Bass claims (p. 10). The 
"easement" spoken of by the court was not the railway easement; 
the court was referring to the easements appurtenant to the 
building. 
Point I.e. of the Bass brief asserts (p. 12) that 
"[t]here being no words in the Surface Owner's Agreement 
precluding an assignment of a share in the proceeds," such an 
assignment may be made. This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, none of the Newton/Bass testimony suggests any intention 
to assign a share in the proceeds, nor does their Deed. 
Second, the Surface Owner's Agreement does preclude the "share 
in the proceeds" theory. Section 10 permits transfer only 
subject to all the inseparability provisions, (R 481), and 
these affix all covenant benefits to the surface title and vest 
the substantive right to covenant proceeds in that person who 
owns the surface when a payment becomes due. To the extent 
that an assignment purports to change that agreed pattern, it 
is explicitly precluded. 
Bass's Point I.C. also asserts (pp. 11-12) that the 
restrictions on assignability were placed there solely for 
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Champlin's benefit, and do not affect the equitable rights of 
assignee and assignor as between themselves. The Newton brief 
(pp. 27-29) presents substantially the same argument. 
The argument is invalid. Both respondents rely on 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §322(2) (1979) for the idea 
that a contract term prohibiting assignment is for the obligor's 
benefit and does not prevent an assignee from acquiring rights 
as against the assignor. The text of §322(2) makes clear that 
the general rule there stated applies "unless a different 
intention is manifested," which is obviously the case here. As 
is stated in Comment a, which explains the rationale for 
§322(2): "In the absence of statute or other contrary public 
policy, the parties to a contract have power to limit the rights 
created by their agreement." 
The quotation in Bass's brief (p. 13) from Martin v. 
National Surety Co., 300 U.S. 588, 596-99 (1937) expresses the 
same qualification: "'After payments have been collected and 
are in the hands of the' surface owner 'with notice, assignments 
may be heeded, at all events in equity if they will not 
frustrate the ends to which the prohibition was directed.'" 
(Emphasis added). The same qualification is apparent with 
respect to the other Bass citations: Stark v. National Research 
and Design Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 315, 110 A.2d 143 (1954): 
Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.2d 405 (1942): 
Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v. Welles, 242 
U.S. 7 (1916). The quotation from 3 Williston, ~ 
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Contracts §422 (Bass brief, p. 14) is distinguishable on that 
basis, and for a further reason. The subject addressed is a 
contract forbidding any assignment. In contrast, the Surface 
Owner's Agreement does not forbid assignment; assignment is 
contemplated if carried out in the agreed way, and indeed is 
required in specified circumstances. Further, the ownership of 
the covenant payments, when the surface is sold, is agreed to 
in explicit terms. The Bass authorities are distinguishable 
for that reason. 
Respondents argue (Bass brief, p. 11; Newton brief, 
pp. 27-28) that the restriction upon assignability had only the 
administrative purpose of affording protection for Champlin's 
payments in accordance with its records. Had that been the 
purpose, the Agreement would simply have said that upon 
sufficient documentation of transfer Champlin would pay the 
successor owner of the covenant benefit. Instead, the 
change-of-ownership language contemplates Champlin's payments 
to a successor upon proof of a chain of title to the surface 
ownership. (R 481) • This reflects the overall substantive 
purpose of assuring the inseparability of covenant benefit from 
surface ownership. 
Both respondents make a further argument claimed to 
free them of "semantics" and to give effect to their intentions 
notwithstanding the rules which preclude them under real 
property law and contract law. (See Bass brief, pp. 14-15, 
Point I.D; Newton brief, pp. 27-28). This argument, and the 
reply, are discussed in Point IV(c) below. 
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POINT II. Inseparability of covenant benefit and 
surface ownership is shown by practical 
construction. 
The appeal brief detailed the instances by which all 
the parties, by actions, recognized the inseparability of the 
covenant benefit from the surface ownership, and instances by 
which Champlin also construed the 2 1/2% covenant to be 
inseparable. 
The Newton brief did not address the point. 
The Bass brief (p. 20) responds only with the 
assertion that the conveyancing of the 2 1/2% interest showed 
that the parties viewed the covenant proceeds as assignable. 
That view does not appear from what the parties did. The most 
that can be claimed for the conveyancing is that Newton and 
Bass attempted a transfer but recognized that transfer might 
not be possible. The quitclaiming nature of the royalty grants 
recognizes inseparability, and the escape clause Bass wrote 
into subparagraph I.B. of the Deed (R 485) (discussed in the 
appeal brief at p. 26) is a most practical reinforcement of 
that recognition. 
The appeal brief failed to mention a further instance 
of practical construction: Champlin's land manager testified 
that in other instances Union Pacific had made it clear that it 
did not recognize separate retention of the payment interest 
(see R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp. 25-26). 
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POINT III. Extrinsic proof is not admissible. 
The appeal brief advanced the argument, based on the 
general rule stated in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 6S3 (Utah 
1979), that the inseparability provisions of the Surface 
Owner's Agreement are without ambiguity, which makes extrinsic 
proof inadmissible. Extrinsic proof to aid in construing the 
Deed and the Contract is immaterial and therefore not 
admissible. 
Neither respondent sought to point out any ambiguity 
in the Surface Owner's Agreement. 
Bass did not address the point of the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence. 
The Newton brief argues (pp. 36-38), first, that 
Flying Diamond "does not identify the objectionable evidence" 
(p. 36). The argument is not well taken. Flying Diamond has 
contended throughout that no extrinsic evidence was admissible. 
Newton argues, secondly (p. 37), that the trial court 
considered no extrinsic evidence as to the Surface Owner's 
Agreement, and that it did not base its findings about the 
intent of the Deed or the Ranch Purchase Contract upon the 
extrinsic evidence but only upon "the conclusion clearly to be 
drawn by the identical wording of the Bass/Newton Deed and the 
Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch Contract." The argument does not 
advance the matter. If the trial court ignored extrinsic 
evidence about the Surface Owner's Agreement, its misreading of 
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the document is a clear legal error. As to the later 
conveyances, the lower court took evidence improperly and 
imputed an "intent" to the conveyances which is obviously 
contrary to their wording taken alone. 
Newton argues, thirdly (p. 38), that Flying Diamond by 
its reliance upon extrinsic proof has waived the point. The 
record Flying Diamond made to save its overall objection is 
shown at the beginning of this brief. Flying Diamond did not 
adopt or use respondents' evidence. It could be no waiver of 
the objection that, after the trial court's general ruling that 
it would take respondents' evidence provisionally (R 526, Tr 
10), Flying Diamond in self defense offered evidence to counter 
that of the respondents. Flying Diamond's proffer of evidence 
as to the background of the Surface Owner's Agreement was a 
necessary response to the ruling (in the denial of its motion 
for summary judgment) that the Surface Owner's Agreement is 
ambiguous, which became the law of the case for purposes of the 
trial. Such a proffer obviously does not constitute a waiver. 
The authorities cited by Newton (United States v. 
Silvers, 374 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. 
Bramson, 139 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1943); and Jarabo v. United 
States, 158 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1946)) have no bearing where the 
evidence was necessarily offered in response to other evidence. 
The Newtons also cite two Utah cases, First Western 
Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 
(1971) and Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 
-19-
376 P.2d 940 (1962). These required determination whether the 
covenant involved was a true covenant running with the land. 
Each involved the disputed factual question whether the parties 
intended that the covenant be a running covenant; in each, the 
covenant was created by an ambiguous instrument 1•hich contained 
no expresssion of intention. That is not the case here. 
POINT IV. The 2 1/2% covenant is not a royalty and was 
not granted or otherwise transferred by the 
Deed. 
The appeal brief argued that the Deed's quitclaim of 
"royalty" did not grant an interest in the 2 1/2% easement 
payment covenant, which is not a royalty. 
Bass and the Newtons dispute the point on two grounds, 
principally their assertion (made at the trial, abandoned after 
the trial, now re-asserted here) that the covenant interest is 
indeed a "royalty" in the technical sense. 
The argument has been belabored at length by all 
parties. It appears from the definitions of royalty quoted by 
the parties (appeal brief, pp. 29-30; Bass brief, p. 9; Newton 
brief, pp. 24-26) that because the 2 1/2% ccvenant is not a 
property right in the oil and gas it is not a royalty. Section 
4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement (R 480) defeats the idea. 
The Newton brief (p. 16) states that the recent case of Bennion 
v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, No. 18345 (Utah 
November 4, 1983) implies that the terminology of royalty is 
not settled. While the definition is not an issue in that 
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case, any implication from the opinion is the opposite of what 
the Newton brief claims. The case involves the nature of the 
interest of a non-consenting fractional mineral owner before 
and after a forced pooling. The Court employs the term royalty 
in its standard sense, and this usage is re-inforced by its use 
of the term "statutory royalty," Bennion, slip op. at 4 (the 
quote marks are the Court's), to refer to the plaintiff's 
interest as altered by the pooling order. It is of note that 
the Court upheld the Board's holding that "statutory royalty" 
entitled the owner to take his portion of production in kind. 
The more interesting argument of Bass and the Newtons 
is that the decision should not turn on semantics, and that 
because they intended the transfer to Bass of a continuing 
one-half of all the covenant benefits the Deed should be 
construed in whatever way will give effect to the intention 
(Bass brief, pp. 14-15; Newton brief, pp. 27-28). Both 
respondents speak of the transaction as an assignment and both 
would apply contract law principles. 
These replies defeat that argument: 
(a) The 2 1/2% covenant is a true running covenant. 
That being so, real property law governs (Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts & Comment b, § 316(2) (1979)) and requires 
reversal of the decision below as a matter of law. Debate 
about contract principles is wholly theoretical. 
(b) As a matter of contract theory, a construction of 
the Deed as an "assignment" is not what respondents now seek. 
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The term is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
s 317 (1) (1979): 
An assignment of a right is a manifestation of 
the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of 
which the assignor's right to performance hy the 
obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the 
assignee acquires a right to such performance. 
Respondents' present theory, if understood correctly, is not an 
"assignment." Bass does not purport to hold a direct right in 
future payments, so that Champlin's payment direct to Bass 
would discharge Champlin's obligation. Respondents say that, 
by the Deed, Bass acquired Newton Sheep's promise that it would 
make future individual successive assignments, or sharings of 
payments, after each individual payment from Champlin is in 
Newton hands. Clearly, the Deed states no such promise, nor is 
there any support for the idea of such a promise in the 
testimony of the Newton brothers. Such a promise is contrary 
to the testimony of Mr. Collister, who wrote the Deed (appeal 
brief, p. 33). As shown below, the supposed promise could not 
have been made effectively had the parties expressed it. 
(c) If all labels be ignored and the case be taken at 
its best for respondents and stated generically, the idea is 
that the documents were meant to transfer to Bass the right to 
share one-half of the benefits promised by Champlin in Section 
2 of the Surface Owner's Agreement, that arrangement to 
continue for the entire life of the Agreement. However it may 
be phrased, the idea is defeated by these inherent flaws: 
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(i) It is an agreed term of the covenant benefit, 
fixed by the instrument which created it, that rights therein 
are not capable of transfer to one who (like Bass) has no 
surface ownership. 
(ii) It is a similarly agreed term of the covenant 
benefit that a beneficiary's rights therein exist only while he 
has ownership of the surface title. Newton Sheep could not 
transfer higher or more enduring rights than it had: e.g., one 
vested with a life estate cannot grant a fee simple; the holder 
of a conditional promise cannot transfer rights in the promise 
free of the condition. (Negotiability is the exception to this 
truism, but neither Bass or the Newtons have so far said that 
the covenant is negotiable paper.) Newton Sheep could not 
transfer rights good past the duration of its own rights in the 
benefit. 
(iii) The instrument of transfer does not manifest an 
intention to transfer rights enduring longer than those of the 
transferrer, or rights not capable of transfer. The Deed's 
stated intent is to transfer only those rights which the 
transferor is entitled to transfer. 
POINT V. Respondents' assignment of proceeds theory 
is contrary to the evidence. 
Point V of the appeal brief (pp. 31-34) showed that 
the conveyancer who prepared the Deed intended a present grant 
of a real property interest in land. He further testified that 
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he used the term "royalty" with an awareness that it excluded 
any idea of "the contractual right to receive monies" (appeal 
brief, p. 33). That evidence is contrary to the assignment 
theory (on which the judgment is based) and contrary to the 
theory of a promise to make future assignments. The 
generalized expressions of the Newton brothers, quoted by Bass 
(pp. 4-5) and the Newtons (pp. 6-7) are to the effect that the 
Newtons meant a present transfer. 
Neither respondent has contrived a theory which 
matches the evidence with the findings, or the judgment. The 
theory of promised future assignments, an afterthought, does 
not do so. 
POINT VI. Estoppel by deed precludes the Bass and 
Newton claims. 
The appeal brief cited authorities which show that 
estoppel by deed precludes Bass and the Newtons. In the 
Surface Owner's Agreement the Newton Company made the 
commitment for itself and its assigns that the 2 1/2% easement 
payment covenant cannot be held, or transferred, separately 
from the surface ownership. Newton and Bass would now say, to 
the contrary, that they have transferred, and now hold, 
fractions of the covenant benefit separately from the surface 
ownership. Estoppel by deed precludes the latter assertion. 
The responses of Newton Sheep and Bass are not 
sufficient to avoid the estoppel: 
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(1) Both respondents say, in effect, that Flying 
Diamond must show reliance in order to invoke estoppel by deed 
(Bass brief, p. 20; Newton brief, p. 34). It is doubted that 
estoppel by deed involves reliance. This estoppel is a 
mechanical rule of property based on considerations of the 
security of land titles, and the elements and defenses usual in 
equitable estoppel decisions do not apply. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver, § 4 (1966). The authority cited by Bass 
(Bass brief, pp. 20-21), 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, 
§ 10 (from the principle stated, it appears and we assume that 
Bass intended to cite § 5) is commented on below. The cases 
cited by Newton do not support its assertion: Ketchum Coal Co. 
v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917) is 
not an estoppel by deed case, the claimed estoppel being 
equitable in nature; Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden, 6 
Ariz. App. 310, 432 P.2d 276 (1967) does not involve any kind 
of estoppel; the problem is bona fide purchaser status. 
Contrary to what Newton claims for Rogers v. Donnellan, 11 Utah 
108, 39 P. 494 (1895), that case comments (favorably to Flying 
Diamond's claims of estoppel) that the maker of a deed of trust 
is estopped to deny his warranties therein, and would not be 
permitted to testify otherwise. Id. at 113, 39 P. at 496. The 
comment is a dictum. The only authority supporting respondents 
is 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5 (1966), which cites 
a stray Ohio case, Case v. Golnar, 33 Ohio App. 389, 169 N.E. 
724 (1928). 
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In any event, and whether reliance is or is not 
required to invoke estoppel by deed, ample reliance is made out 
here. Flying Diamond contracted to buy, and it paid for, the 
full surface title to the Ranch. Since its purchase, it has 
conducted the surface ranch operation subject to the burdens of 
the oil and gas operator's uses of the surface easements, and 
it has justifiably relied upon the agreed provisions in the 
Surface Owner's Agreement that the surface payments compensate 
the surface owner for the easement burdens. 
(2) A further Newton argument (pp. 34-35) appears to 
be that the Ranch Purchase Contract "conveyed what Flying 
Diamond bargained for" and that Flying Diamond seeks by 
estoppel to exceed the terms of the Contract. Colman v. 
Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976) and Dowse v. Kammerman, 122 
Utah 85, 246 P.2d 881 (1952) are cited. If it be the rule that 
estoppel by deed does not enlarge a grant, the rule does not 
operate here. Flying Diamond seeks only what it paid for and 
what was granted to it, a warranted "full" surface title. That 
title carries with it the benefit of the 2 1/2% easement 
payment covenant which runs with the surface ownership. 
(3) Newton Sheep argues that the Surface Owners 
Agreement "is not a deed but a contract" (Newton brief, p. 35), 
so the estoppel by deed concept is not applicable. Newton's 
own quotation of 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5 
(1966) (Newton brief, p. 35) shows that estoppel by deed can 
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apply in cases of a "deed or similar instrument." The Surface 
Owner's Agreement is clearly the present grant of easements. 
The grant is sufficient to raise estoppel by deed, and the 
estoppel works against the Newton Company and against Newton 
Sheep and Bass, its privies. 
POINT VII. Flying Diamond is not estopped. 
The appeal brief (pp. 36-38) showed the error of the 
lower court's Finding No. 9 (R 428) and Conclusion No. 7 (R 
429) that Flying Diamond was estopped. It was there shown that 
equitable estoppel is not invoked by a quitclaim transaction, 
and that the evidence was contrary to Finding No. 9. 
The estoppel arguments of Bass (pp. 15-19) and the 
Newtons (pp. 29-32) are essentially similar. It is claimed 
that Flying Diamond "agreed to" a one-fourth interest in the 
covenant, which was granted to it by paragraph 6(a) (2) of the 
Ranch Purchase Contract (R 493-94), and equitable 
considerations estop Flying Diamond from claiming a greater 
interest. Bass says (p. 19) that Flying Diamond seeks to enjoy 
a benefit of the Contract (ownership of the railroad lands) and 
to avoid its burden (only a one-fourth interest in the proceeds 
of production). The Newtons say (p. 31) that "ordinarily a 
party (or contract purchaser) cannot claim under an instrument 
without affirming it." 
The replies are: 
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(1) Both respondents rely upon incorrect recitals of 
the testimony on this point. Bass says (p. 16): "The 
testimony of Scott and Ralph Newton (Tr. 64) shows that Flying 
Diamond was told of the Newtons' deed to Bass and agreed to a 
one-fourth share of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment." The 
Newton brief says (p. 31) "Flying Diamond drafted the [ranch 
purchase] contract to accommodate Newton who insisted on 
retaining their 1/4 percent." 
These statements do not reflect the actual Newton 
testimony, which is clear that the fractions spoken of were not 
fractions of 100%, but were instead fractions of the Newton 
ownership. Scott Newton testified that the sale to Bass was 
"half of our interest," and "they [Flying Diamond] would take a 
quarter of what was left of the half" (R 526, Tr 65). 
Similarly, Ralph Newton testified that Flying Diamond "wouldn't 
buy the property without 50 percent of our interests" (R 526, 
Tr 80). Another discrepancy in the Bass summary is its 
statement (Bass brief, pp. 5-6) that "(t]he Newtons' interest 
in the 2 1/2% payment was the only mineral interest of any type 
that the Newtons had in the railroad lands." The record is 
that at trial the Newton counsel noted for the record the 
existence of another kind of mineral claim in the railroad 
lands (R 526, Tr 11), and Bass's conveyancer testified that 
other ("Radke-type") mineral interests might be involved 
(R 527, Deposition of Collister, pp. 21-22; Bass brief, p. 7). 
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The point of all of the foregoing is that (in contrast 
with Newton Sheep's mineral titles in the fee lands, which were 
much more important to the transaction) the parties were 
uncertain about the nature and extent of the Newton mineral and 
"royalty" interests in the railroad sections, and that 
therefore that part of their Deed affecting those sections did 
not purport to make a warranted grant of one-half of 100%. It 
was instead a quitclaiming grant of one-half of what the 
Newtons might be entitled to grant. The Ranch Purchase 
Contract followed the pattern. Equitable estoppel does not 
apply, because a quitclaim will not give rise to such an 
estoppel. (See appeal brief, p. 37). 
Bass's brief claims (p. 19) that the royalty grant to 
Flying Diamond was not a quitclaim (so as to obviate the 
estoppel) and notes that the Ranch Purchase Contract calls for 
"a Warranty Deed." The substance of this is that the interest 
to be conveyed under the Contract is there described as 
one-half of whatever royalty Newton Sheep is entitled to 
convey. A "warranted" grant of such an interest does not call 
the covenants of warranty into operation. One lacking any 
interest in the Brooklyn Bridge can safely execute a warranty 
deed describing all his right, title and interest in the 
Bridge; his grantee takes nothing and the granter has breached 
no warranty. Such a deed, however labelled, is not a warranty 
deed. 
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(2) Bass's principal reliance is upon Russell v. 
Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 
938 (1957). The Russell case is distinguishable, and it 
illustrates the difference between a correctly applied estoppel 
and the present situation. The property in the Russell case 
was deeded by the Northern Pacific to Russell's predecessor in 
1918, Northern Pacific reserving all minerals. Russell 
acquired the grantee's title, with notice of the mineral 
reservation. Texaco, Northern Pacific's oil and gas lessee, 
conducted "extensive operations" on the property, beginning in 
1952. Russell thereafter sued Texaco and Northern Pacific for 
a quiet title declaration that the oil and gas lease and the 
mineral reservation were void, Russell's theory being that the 
title acquired by Northern Pacific under the congressional 
railroad land grant was such a title as not to be susceptible 
to a mineral reservation by the railroad. 
The decision upholds the mineral reservation and the 
lease. The opinion holds that as a "fundamental" a quiet title 
plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not 
the weakness of the defendant's title. 238 F.2d at 639. 
Russell failed because he could "assert no independent source 
of title" to the minerals. The court said that even had 
Russell's incorrect theory about Congressional intent been 
sound, Russell would be estopped to assert it. The court made 
this observation about estoppel: 
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Estoppel, in the nature of an equitable concept, is 
designed to protect the reliances and expectations of 
innocent persons from detrimental devastation by those 
whose assent and recognition have induced those 
reliances and expectations. 
Id. at 640. The obvious distinctions of the present case from 
the Russell facts are, first, that while Russell had no 
"independent source of title," Flying Diamond has. Flying 
Diamond's ownership of the benefit of the easement payment 
covenant vested by the warranted grant to it of the surface 
title in which the covenant benefit inheres. Second, on this 
record (and unlike Northern Pacific and Texaco in the Russell 
case), Bass and the Newtons can scarcely claim that their 
"reliances and expectations [are those) of innocent persons" 
which are entitled to protection from "detrimental devastation 
by those who by assent and recognition have induced those 
reliances and expectations." Exhibits 9 (R 521-22) and 20 (R 
524-25) show that there was no innocence about the Bass/Newton 
transaction, which was made within weeks (See R 484) after both 
parties' awareness of Champlin's careful advice that the 2 1/2% 
covenant ran with the surface ownership, and that after a 
surface sale Newton Sheep would not receive any payments. Nor 
is there any innocence about the complicated effort to 
circumvent the advice. Further, Flying Diamond did not induce 
any of the Bass/Newton reliances and expectations; it had not 
entered the picture. 
(3) Bass and the Newtons cite many cases and 
authorities for the proposition that, as the Newton brief puts 
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it (p. 31), "Flying Diamond may not by its actions both claim 
under the contract and at the same time claim it is not bound 
by its terms." The Russell case discussed above is one such 
case, and a list of others is cited (Newton brief, pp. 31-32; 
Bass brief, pp. 17-19). All are distinguishable by the basic 
fact that Flying Diamond seeks only to have the Ranch Purchase 
Contract enforced in accordance with all of its terms. No 
claim is made by Flying Diamond that it is not bound by any 
provision of the Contract. 
(4) As a further basis for the claimed estoppel of 
Flying Diamond, the Newton brief asserts with apparent 
seriousness that "one is not permitted in a court of justice to 
take advantage of • his own wrong." (Newton brief, p • 
32). The "wrong" assigned to Flying Diamond is that in 
preparing the Ranch Purchase Contract it followed the language 
of the earlier Deed. The brief does not further explain why 
this use of the prior language was wrong but that it was not so 
when first employed. The idea of counter estoppel, suggested 
by the Newton brief (p. 31), applies. The Newtons and Bass 
cannot be heard to call improper the very pattern they 
themselves set. 
(5) Russell, 238 F.2d 636, holds that reliance must 
be shown by one who would invoke equitable estoppel. See also 
~- -~-
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §§ 35 & 76 (1966). Bass 
and the Newtons made their transaction long before Flying 
Diamond entered the scene, and neither has done anything since 
that time in reliance upon Flying Diamond. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents' briefs failed to meet the points raised 
in the appeal brief. The judgment below should be vacated. 
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